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 Arbitration and the Constitution
1
 is authored by Peter B. Rutledge, a professor of 
Law and the Herman E. Talmadge Chair at the University of Georgia School of law.  
Rutledge is an internationally recognized figure in the field of international dispute 
resolution.  The culmination of years of thinking, speaking, teaching and writing about 
arbitration inspired Rutledge to write Arbitration and the Constitution.  Many of 
Rutledge’s insights into the field of arbitration and the Constitution are a result of 
conversations with other professors, judges, lawyers and students.
2
  
 Arbitration and the Constitution, while not the first publication relating to this 
subject, examines the compatibility of arbitration and the Constitution using a novel, 
comprehensive, and methodical method.  Notably, Rutledge sets out to achieve two 
separate goals with his methodical examination of the constitutionality of arbitration.
3
 
Rutledge first charts the breaking down of the separation between arbitration and the 
Constitution and then provides a critique of those changes.
4
 
 Rutledge introduces the thesis of his work, the theory of “seepage
5
,” rather than 
direct doctrinal influences, to examine the relationship that arbitration and constitutional 
law have upon each other. He asserts that constitutional norms infiltrate arbitration law 
through the actions of all three branches of government, shaping the future course of 
arbitration.
6
  This focus on “seepage” allows Rutledge to examine diverse case law and 
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 PETER RUTLEDGE, ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (2013). 
2
 Id. at ix. 
3
 Id. at 5 (“First, as a positive matter, the book aims to chart systematically the breakdown of the wall 
separating the two disciplines and the alloying of their various principles.  Second, as a normative matter, 




 RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 5 (“Over the past half century, constitutional norms increasingly have worked 
their way into arbitration law and, to a lesser extent, arbitration law has influenced the development of 
constitutional norms.  Tellingly, this seepage between the two disciplines has not occurred with a great deal 
of systemic thought or deliberation.  Instead, it has tended to take place through incremental developments 
in various fields of arbitration, often occurring in isolation of each other and with little consideration of the 
broader implications of the growing interconnectivity of these two disciplines.”). 
6
 Id. (“[S]eepage takes various forms.  In some cases, constitutional norms have affected arbitration law 
through the design of treaties or statutes by the executive or legislative branches.  In other cases, 





move beyond familiar significant cases. Starting with Mitsubishi, Rutledge begins his 
writing with the downfall of the non-arbitrability doctrine, allowing for the initial 
breakdown of the wall between arbitration and the Constitution.
7
  He then uses a mixture 
of novel cases to iterate the various arguments for the constitutionality of arbitration. 
II. OVERVIEW 
 Arbitration and the Constitution is organized into three sections, each containing 
two chapters, for a total of six distinct chapters.  Every chapter/section contains a short 
introduction and conclusion.  Although the book covers a wide breadth of material, it is 
fairly short at just over 200 pages.
8
 
 The book’s first section discusses issues relating to the separation of powers of to 
judicial review and executive powers.  Chapter One examines whether there are 
“structural limits on Congress’s ability to require judicial enforcement of an arbitrator’s 
award absent de novo review of the award.”
9
 Chapter Two focuses on “separation-of-
powers issues raised by more specialized forms of arbitration.”
10
 
 The second section of the book also examines separation of powers, but focuses 
on vertical separation-of-powers principles involving federalism and the states.
11
  Chapter 
Three looks at the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
12
 and how it effects the states.
13
  




 The third section focuses on “the relationship between arbitration and individual 
liberties.”
15
 Chapter Five tests whether arbitration should be considered “state action” and 
the due process issues involved in arbitration.
16
 Chapter Six looks at other constitutional 
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 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§1-307(2012). 
13
 RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 10. 
14








liberties, such as the right to a jury trial, and explores why an arbitration agreement is a 
valid waiver of one’s constitutional rights.
17
 
III. PART I. ARBITRATION AND SEPARATION OF POWERS 
A. Chapter One: Arbitration and Judicial Review 
 Chapter One opens by examining whether arbitration is incompatible with the 




  Rutledge notes that prior to 
the twentieth century, arbitration agreements were rarely enforced as the agreements were 
viewed as “unenforceable attempts to appropriate [the court’s] jurisdiction.”
20
  Early 
courts did not anchor their decisions on Article III.  Most courts prior to the twentieth 
century relied on the “jurisdictional ouster” argument to invalidate arbitration clauses, 
which they deemed to be contrary to public policy.
21
  Presently, Article III attacks upon 
arbitration have consistently been rejected by the Supreme Court.
22
 
 Rutledge examines several justifications used to support the constitutionality of 
arbitration with regard to Article III courts.  Rutledge first looks at the argument that 
arbitration is valid because the parties “have waived their right to an Article III forum.”
23
  
Rutledge finds this reasoning, supported by CFTC v. Schor,
24
 troublesome, taking issue 
with the presumption that Article III confers onto individuals both personal rights, which 
may be waived, and non-personal rights, which are nonwaivable.
25
 
                                                 
17
 RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 11. 
18
 See U.S. CONST., art. III, §1 (“The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme 
Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”). 
19




 Id.  
22
 Id. at 53. 
23
 RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 18. 
24
 CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851-53 (1986) (asserting that Article III confers a “personal right” by 
citing dicta from earlier decisions); but see Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the 
Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of 
Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L REV. 1 (1997) (“Even the Court’s Decision in CFTC v. 
Schor which accepted denial of an Article III court in one context, recognized that a broad denial of the 
Article III jurisdiction might well be unconstitutional even if parties had waived their rights.”) 
25




 Rutledge examines the language of Article III, as well as several cases, to support 
his conclusion that Article III rights are not personal rights to individuals, which are 
subject to waiver.
26
  He states that “[t]extually, it is difficult to argue that Article III 
confers a personal right.”
27
  Rutledge posits that, structurally, Article III does not support 
the conclusion that it provides for a personal right, as the first articles of the Constitution 
focus on the “structural organization of our [] government; most of the discussion of 
rights appears in the amendments.”
28
  This section of the book, however, is very brief, 
and Rutledge does not hash out his arguments as completely as possible to ensure clarity 
is achieved for his reader. 
 The book then moves on to a very brief examination of two other justifications for 
the permissibility of arbitration in regard to Article III jurisdiction, before settling upon 
the “appellate review theory” as the most convincing rationale for the permissibility of 
arbitration with regard to Article III.
29
  Rutledge does not go into much detail on the other 
two possible justifications for permissibility of arbitration with regard to Article III, 
devoting just a short paragraph to each.
30
 
 The appellate review theory establishes the presumption that arbitration is valid, 
because the provision of judicial review of arbitral awards provides enough oversight by 
constitutional courts to satisfy the requirements of Article III.
31
  The theory is rooted in 
two sets of values: the benefits of Article III courts and the benefits of non-Article III 
tribunals.
32
  Rutledge lists the benefits of Article III courts, including separation of 
powers, fairness, and judicial integrity, and weighs them against the benefits of non-
Article III entities, which include expertise, efficiency in governmental functions, 
flexibility, fairness, and sovereign immunity.
33
  The text goes on to support a modified 
appellate review theory, where there is at least some degree of Article III review of 
                                                 
26
 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (demonstrating how separation of powers principles 
generally prohibit one branch from performing the functions of another).; see also U.S. Bancorp Mtg Co. v. 
Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S.. 18 (1994) (supporting the idea that public interests are undermined when the 
judiciary is undermined). 
27




 RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 24-25 (looking at a literalist interpretation method and distinction between 
“cases” and “controversies” method of justification for the constitutionality of arbitration). 
30
 Id. at 24-25. 
31
 Id. at 25-26; see Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62-65 (1932).; see also Richard H Fallon, Jr., Of 
Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 933 (1988) (“The core 
claim of [appellate] review theory is that sufficiently searching review of a legislative court’s or 
administrative agency’s decisions by a constitutional court will always satisfy the requirements of Article 
III.”). 
32
 RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 34. 
33




arbitral decisions, but deference to non-Article III entities remains paramount.
34
 Rutledge 
concludes that the appellate review theory supports the constitutionality of the 
jurisdictional oust of Article III courts by arbitral agreements by carefully balancing the 
values of each against the other.
35
 
B. Chapter Two: Arbitration and Executive Power 
 Chapter Two, like Chapter One, focuses on separation of powers, but shifts away 
from the Article III courts to the Article II executive branch.
36
  In this chapter, Rutledge 
turns away from commercial and private arbitration and focuses on trade and investment 




 Rutledge takes a narrow approach to his examination of the interaction between 
arbitration and the executive branch, focusing on issues related to the Appointments 
Clause
38
 and the Take Care Clause.
39
  More specifically, the text examines the 
constitutionality of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
40
  To illustrate 
his position, Rutledge examines a case involving a dispute over Canadian softwood 
lumber, which arose from treaty agreements between the United States and Canada.
41
  
The case raised the question of whether the arbitrators were “officers of the United 
States,” and if so, whether vesting others with the power to appoint arbitrators in such 
                                                 
34
 RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 41. 
35
 Id. at 53.  
36
 See U.S. CONST., art. II-III; RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 55. 
37
 RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 55. 
38
 See U.S. CONST., art. II, §2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not 
herein provided for, and which shall be established by Law, but the Congress may by law vest the 
appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of law, or 
in the Heads of Departments.”); see also RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 55. 
39
 See U.S. CONST., art. II, §3 ([The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed ...”); see 
also RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 64. 
40
 North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 
2057 (1993). 
41
 RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 56; see also Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports Executive Comm. v. United 
States, 471 F.3d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see also John J Garman and Matthew K Bell, The North American 
Free Trade Agreement: Looking at the Binational Panel System Through the Lens of Free Enterprise Fund, 
10 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 525, 538 (2011) (“The appointment of panelists by foreign governments is 
in no way reconcilable with the mandates of the Appointments Clause. ... The Constitution, in no way, 




treaty-disputes usurped the powers vested in the President.
42
  Rutledge concludes his 
examination by stating that “because the mechanism for appointing arbitrators to 
binational panels does not aggrandize a coordinate branch of government, it does not run 
afoul of the Appointments Clause.”
43
 
 Chapter Two concludes with an examination of whether the Appointments Clause 
and the Take Care Clause have any effects on private arbitration involving the United 
States as a party.
44
  After utilizing several authorities and conducting a thorough analysis 
considering whether and to what extent the United States government can enter into 
binding arbitration, Rutledge asserts that private contractual arbitration with the United 
States does not offend the Appointments Clause.
45
  that the Take Care Clause is not an 
impediment because, in most cases, there is not a positive law that states the United 




 Ultimately, Chapter Two asserts that Article II is not an impediment to 
arbitration.
47
 In most contexts, the manner of appointing arbitrators has been found to be 
consistent with the Appointments Clause.
48
  Furthermore, the decision rendered by an 
arbitrator does not impinge the President’s power to “Take Care” that the laws of the 
United States be “faithfully executed.”
49
 
IV. PART II: ARBITRATION AND FEDERALISM 
A. Chapter Three: Arbitration, State Action 
 In Chapter Three, Rutledge tackles the problem of federal preemption of state law 
under the Supremacy Clause.
50
  This chapter examines the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements, arbitral procedure, and the enforcement of arbitral awards.
51
   
                                                 
42
 RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 57. 
43
 Id. at 63. 
44
 See U.S. CONST., art. II, §2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST., art. II, §3; RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 70. 
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 RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 72. 
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 RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 73. 
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 See U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the 




 Starting his examination at federal preemption of state law, Rutledge examines 
several well-known Supreme Court cases where federal preemption of state arbitration 
law has been upheld.
52
  In one example, Southland Corp. v. Keating, the Supreme Court 
held that Section 2 of the FAA
53
 preempted a California state franchising law voiding 
arbitration clauses in franchise agreements.
54
  In doing so, the Court first concluded that 
Section 2 applied to state court.
55
  The Court relied on three main justifications for their 
decision. First, the court relied on its earlier decision in Prima Paint
56





  Second, the Court looked to the legislative history of the FAA to determine 
that the legislature had intended the FAA to apply in state court.
59
  Finally, the Court 
applied federal policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements, which required 
that Section 2 be applied evenly across state and federal courts.
60
 
 Chapter Three moves on to examine federalism and its bearing on arbitral 
procedure.
61
  Rutledge claims that the Supreme Court has shown a “comparatively 
greater tolerance of federalism principles in the context of arbitration procedures” than 
                                                                                                                                                 
any Thing in the Constitution of Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.”); RUTLEDGE, supra 
note 1 at 79. 
51
 RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 81-99. 
52
 Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); RUTLEDGE, supra note 1 at 83-86; AT&T Mobility v. 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); RUTLEDGE, supra note 1 at 91-92; Doctors Associates v. Casarotto, 
517 U.S. 681 (1996); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. 
Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 
388 U.S. 395 (1967); RUTLEDGE, supra note 1 at 83-86. 
53
 9 U.S.C. §2 (2006) (“A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to 
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such a contract or transaction, or the refusal to 
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing 
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”). 
54
 Southland v. Keating, supra note 47. 
55
 RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 83. 
56
 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., supra note 47 (Stating that Section 2 applied 
in a diversity case.). 
57
 Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., supra note 47 (Stating, in dicta, that 
Section 2 created substantive federal law that applied to both federal and state courts.). 
58










with enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards.
62
  Rutledge argues that this 
loosening of federal control is likely an effort “to support arbitration as an institution”
63
 
and allows an opportunity “for state law to play a role in the arbitral procedures.”
64
   
 Finally, Chapter Three concludes with an examination of the enforcement of 
arbitral awards.  Section 10 of the FAA clearly states that its application is limited to U.S. 
District courts.
65
   The limited application of Section 10, coupled with the limits of 
removability of arbitration actions to federal court, provides states an opportunity to take 
an important role in enforcement proceedings.
66
  States with anti-arbitration statutes 
governing the enforcement of awards have greater power than those governing the 
procedural aspects of arbitration.
67
  This gives the losing party in arbitration proceedings 
a great incentive to seek vacatur in the most arbitration-unfriendly forum available to 
them.
68
  Once an arbitral award is vacated, the state’s decision is backed by full faith and 
credit principles.
69
  In this manner, the laws governing enforcement of arbitral awards 
grant state courts and legislatures tremendous room to promote anti-arbitration 
sentiment.
70
 Rutledge’s explanation and depth of analysis on this matter was unsatisfying 
in its brevity. 
B. Chapter Four: Arbitration and Choice of Law 
 Chapter Four focuses on arbitration agreements and choice of law provisions, 
evaluating freedom of contract principles and whether “parties can (and should be able 
to) contract around” rules that support federal law.
71
  Rutledge examines three critical 
choice of law provisions.
72
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 RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 96. 
63
 Id. at 97. 
64
 Id. at 94. 
65
 9 U.S.C. §10 (2006); RUTLEDGE, supra note 1 at 97. 
66










 RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 101. 
72
 Id. at 104. 
73




Next, the text moves to choice of forum provisions for the hearing on the merits.  Finally, 
the chapter moves into choice of forum clauses for any procedural challenges.
74
 
 This chapter first focuses on choice of law provisions in the arbitration agreement.  
Rutledge utilizes three well known cases
75
 to reach his claim that the Supreme Court’s 
opinion of federal preemption has shifted “from a ‘default’ system to an increasingly 
‘mandatory’ one.”
76
  Rutledge argues that this conclusion is supported by the Court’s 
decisions  that have trimmed the ability of parties, through choice of law or forum 




 The text then moves to an examination of the “law governing arbitration 
proceedings.”
78
  This section examines “the relationship among federalism, choice and 
arbitral procedure,” which has “focused principally on the choices about forums, whether 
arbitral or judicial,”
79
 and to what extent “the choice of forum influence[s] the arbitrator’s 
resort to the forum state’s arbitral law.”
80
  Rutledge argues that choice of forum clauses 
may allow the arbitrator to look to state law to determine the procedures to follow, and 




 Rutledge focuses on Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle
82
 to demonstrate the 
influence state law can have on arbitration proceedings.  In Bazzle, “the arbitrator’s 
decision to follow the state court’s reasoning” in an arbitration proceeding “indicated that 
an arbitrator wanted to construe state law in the same manner as the state courts in order 
to secure an enforceable award.”
83
  The Court acknowledged that “one of the main goals 
of the arbitrators was to render an enforceable award under South Carolina law with 
respect to the permissibility of multi-party arbitration.”
84
 
                                                 
74
 RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 104. 
75
 Volt Info. Scis, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989); 
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995); Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008). 
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 Id. at 113. 
80
 Id. at 115. 
81
 RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 115. 
82
 See Green Tree Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 453 (2003). 
83
 RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 115-16. 
84




 Choice of forum on the part of the parties can influence the arbitrator to fall back 
on the forum state’s arbitral law.
85
  Arbitrators may look to state law to determine what 
procedures should be followed, or they may be influenced by a state’s laws which contain 
the grounds for award vacatur.
86
  Rutledge posits that arbitrators have a natural yearning 
to render enforceable awards, and, therefore, may follow state laws as closely as possible 
to ensure that their awards are not vacated.
87
 
 The end of Chapter Four is devoted to a consideration of how federalism and 
personal autonomy correlate with the enforcement of arbitral awards in both state and 
federal courts.
88
  Rutledge examines Hall Street v. Mattel,
89
 which addresses the parties’ 
ability to expand judicial review of their arbitral awards by contract.
90
  Rutledge 
examines the issue of federal courts and state courts coming to different conclusions 
about the appropriate balance in their enforcement of arbitral awards. 
91
  The text briefly 
goes on to explore the disparity between federal and state enforcement of arbitral awards 
and the benefits that protection of federalist values provides.
92
 
V. PART III: ARBITRATION AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
A. Chapter Five: Arbitration, State Action and Due Process 
 Chapter Five initiates the text’s discussion of individual rights by starting with an 
evaluation of state action and the Due Process Clauses.
93
 Rutledge examines whether 
                                                 
85






 Id. at 116. 
89
 See Hall Street Associates L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
90




 Id. at 121 (“[F]rom the perspective of federalism values ... [i]t enables parties, through their affirmative 
choice, to give effect to state regulatory decisions designed to give even greater effect than the federal 
standard.   To be sure, the greater diversity of state practice  - and the variation from federal practice - 
tolerated by these rules dampens the uniformity goals that animated decisions such as Southland.  Yet 
perhaps this is a sensible price - at least in cases where the federalism values are wedded with freedom-of-
contract values (that is, giving effect to the parties’ choices about the scope of judicial review of the 
award.”). 
93








 Rutledge concludes that arbitration is not a state action, eliminating any strict 
requirement for procedural due process in the arbitration process.
95
  This does not mean, 
however, that there is no constitutional “seepage” which permeates the arbitration 
process.
96
 Constitutional protections and procedural fairness have made their way into the 




 After stating his conclusion, that arbitration is not a state action, the author 
presents a question: “If arbitral institutions are not constitutionally obligated to subject 
the arbitrations they administer to protections of procedural due process, why have they 
chosen to do so voluntarily?”
98




 First, the text presents the logical explanation that the “introduction of due 
process norms into arbitration is a natural product of the doctrine.”
100
  This explanation is 
grounded in the standards for judicial review of arbitral awards.
101
  However, this 
explanation fails for two reasons.
102
 One reason is that due process protocols cannot be 
explained by this theory, and due process extends more protection than would be 
provided under constitutional standards.
103
  Another reason is that the “logical 




 The second explanation is sociological, arising from literature on the socialization 
of attorneys.
105
  Under this theory, attorneys who partake in alternative dispute resolution 
                                                 
94
 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
95
 RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 145. 
96
 Id. at 145. 
97
 Id. at 145-56. 
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 Id. at 148. 
99
 Id. at 149-56. 
100








 RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 149-56. 
105




have been socialized to observe certain values, including due process and fairness.
106
  
Unfortunately, this theory cannot account for the timing of the development of due 
process protocols, nor the initial resistance of arbitration to accept the protocols.
107
  
Additionally, the failure of arbitrators to follow certain rules and enforcement of those 
awards is incompatible with this explanation.  One would expect that arbitral institutions 
would be ensuring that all faulty or unjust arbitral awards were remedied.
108
 
 The third possible explanation examined by Rutledge is economic, under which 
arbitration can be conceptualized as a product competing against other alternative dispute 
resolution services.
109
  Accordingly, due processes protocols are a way for arbitral 
institutions to distinguish themselves and become more appealing to the consumer.
110
  
While this theory is appealing, due process protocols do not favor the arbitral institutions, 
but rather the consumer.
111
  The economic theory creates a system that serves the best 
interests of the participants in the arbitral process.
112
  By serving the parties’ interests, the 
arbitral institution reduces the risk of disruption to the process and creates a predictable, 
secure proceeding.
113
  Further, the economic explanation can provide an adequate 
explanation to the scope and timing of the protocol’s development, unlike the previous 
two theories.
114
 Providing greater scope to the due process protections under the 
protocols than would be minimally available leads the parties to feel more secure in the 
arbitral award.
115
  As to the timing of the protocol’s development, arbitration institutions 
began to shift their focus toward procedural fairness after Gilmer.
116
  Gilmer gave 
arbitration institutions the incentive to review and update their due process protocol to 
ensure the fairness of their proceedings.
117
  This theory leaves holes to be examined in 
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 RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 152. 
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 Id. at 152. 
115
 Id. at 154. 
116






why arbitral institutions do not have complete due process protocols or protections in 
place, requiring a political argument to complete the picture.
118
  
 The fourth, and final, explanation is political.
119
  Rutledge posits that politics 
might explain how the norms developed, stating that “[p]rivate norms such as voluntarily 
adopted industry standards can regulate private behavior.  Public law can form a similar 
function.”
120
  This law can come in various forms, from formal legislation to 
administrative agency oversight.
121
  Rutledge states that “regulation by the protocols 
emerged as a second-best solution for the various participants in the arbitral system.
122
 
 Chapter Five then turns to an evaluation of ways that due process principles have 
entered arbitration over time, especially in international treaties.
123
 While Rutledge’s 
thesis, which states that United States constitutional principles have “seeped” into the 
arbitration process may be correct, it is unclear whether United States constitutional 
concerns would be relevant to arbitrators or arbitral proceedings abroad. This section of 
the book seems incongruous with the author’s thesis.  Proving that United States 
constitutional norms have infiltrated foreign arbitration affairs would be difficult.  
Instead, Rutledge’s argument could have been more convincing if he had focused on 
domestic arbitration proceedings, rather than international arbitration. 
B. Chapter Six: Arbitration and the Jury Right 
 The final chapter, Chapter Six, discusses how the constitutionally granted right to 
a jury trial is influenced by developments in arbitration law.
124
  The author delves into 
both state and federal law implications, as juries are a facet of both federal and state 
proceedings and have an important impact on the outcome of a dispute.
125
  A subject of 
hot debate, some people believe that juries tend to award larger damages than judges.
126
  
Other times, the fear of having their case before a jury is enough to force parties to settle 
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 RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 156. 
124
 See U.S. CONST., amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right to jury trial shall be reserved.”); RUTLEDGE, supra note 1 at 170. 
125






before the dispute proceeds to trial.
127
  Waiver of this important right will likely affect a 
litigant’s incentives when it comes to desired outcome of the arbitral proceeding.
128
 
 Rutledge moves in Chapter Six to answer the question of whether an arbitration 
clause effectively waives a party’s right to a jury trial.
129
  To answer this question, the 
author examines several related questions: (1) whether the right to a jury is waivable at 
all; (2) if a waivable right can be disposed of on a pre-dispute basis; and (3) whether the 
right, if both waivable and one that can be waived pre-dispute, has in fact been waived by 
the parties in the language they choose in their arbitration agreement.
130
 
 In examining whether a jury right can be waived, Rutledge states that, in most 
instances, constitutional jurisprudence is to recognize the possibility of waiver.
131
  To 
determine if a right is waivable, the author considers whether a jury right is private (i.e., 
individual) or public in nature.
132
  Rutledge relies upon the Seventh Amendment, which 
includes opportunities for waiver, to establish that the right to a jury is a waivable right 
under federal law.
133
  It is “clear [ ] that parties in noncriminal matters likewise can waive 
their rights.”
134
  The text points out that the ability to alienate one’s jury right is not 
without costs, both to the party and to society.
135
   
 FAA preemption may provide the escape hatch for dealing with the question of 
alienability of one’s state right to a jury.  If this were the case, the alienability of one’s 
state right to a jury would be preempted by the FAA due to the Supremacy clause.  This 
line of reasoning is not without flaw, however, because state guarantees to a jury trial are 
not blatant anti-arbitration clauses.  As such, the state guarantees might be able to survive 
a Section 2 challenge.
136
  If these state guarantees to a trial by jury were in the form of an 
anti-arbitration statute, a Section 2 challenge may be more effective. This area of law is 
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 The next section of this chapter examines the pre-dispute waiver.  Rutledge 
explains  his argument as follows: 
 
The argument against pre-dispute waiver rests on the assumption 
that, until the parties know the complete contours of a dispute, they 
lack the necessary information to make a fully informed choice 
whether to exercise, or waive, their right to a jury trial.  Pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses force parties to make a decision about that 
important right before they have full (or at least adequate) 
information on the nature of their dispute.
138
 
 Rutledge acknowledges that pre-dispute arbitration agreements have historically 
been acceptable in the United States.
139
  Concluding this section, the author states that it 
is “therefore unsurprising that the most serious debates have turned not on the categorical 
possibility (or impossibility) of pre-dispute waiver but, instead, the conditions under 
which such waiver can be effective.”
140
 
 The final section of Chapter Six involves an examination of the requisite language 
to waive the right to a trial by jury.
141
  The text describes various safeguards that are 
implemented in other proceedings before a party can waive an individual right.
142
  
Rutledge examines several of these methods, including the cooling-off period, witnesses, 
attorneys, pendency of the litigation, and judges.
143
  
 After an analysis of various waivers of other types of procedural rights, Rutledge 
provides his own variation to the pre-dispute jury waiver.
144
  He examines the possibility 
of including an explicit jury waiver in the arbitration agreement, which he argues would 
provide “the clearest evidence that the assent to arbitration includes an assent to waiver of 
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 RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 192 (for example, giving Miranda warnings to arrestees, or other 
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  Less convincing, he states that an arbitration clause, which contains 
provisions where a party gives up their “right to litigate claims ‘through a court,’” could 
be read to imply consent to a waiver of a jury right.
146
  Finally, Rutledge mentions the 
general arbitration clause, without elaborate mention of one’s jury right.
147
  In these 
cases, Rutledge justifies the dismissal of one’s jury right to the assumption that “when a 
party [agrees] to arbitration, it is understood what arbitration meant.”
148
 
 Following his analysis, Rutledge concludes that a standard arbitration clause 
containing language sufficient to put the parties on notice of the rights that they are 
waiving should be considered a valid waiver of the party’s right to a jury trial.
149
   
VI. CONCLUSION 
 Arbitration and the Constitution contains a brief conclusion that acts as a 
summary for the major themes of the book.
150
  Rutledge states that the wall between 
arbitration and the constitution, while once quite solid and firm, “endures today, but is 
not as firm as it was a century or even a half-century ago.  The past six chapters have 




 The first theme encompassed in this book is the limited doctrinal impact that the 
constitution has had on arbitration law.
152
  While there have, doubtless, been 
constitutional impacts on arbitration law, the constitutional values have not affected 
arbitration to the extent of “direct doctrinal incorporation.”
153
  
 A second theme examined in this book was the sub-doctrinal influences asserted 
upon arbitration law, such as international treaties and due process protocols.
154
  Without 
direct doctrinal incorporation, arbitration institutions have been influenced by 
constitutional limits in a softer and less concrete manner.
155
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 Finally, the third theme of this book was the “dialogic influence[].”
156
  As stated 
by Rutledge, “[t]hat is, because the debate over constitutional principles in arbitration 
takes place at the sub-constitutional level, it facilitates a far greater dialogue between 
institutions of the state as well as with private parties.”
157
 
 Arbitration and the Constitution is a very brief overview of the constitutional 
principles engaged in arbitration proceedings.  Rutledge does a fabulous job presenting 
his thesis of the “seepage” of constitutional norms into the arbitration sphere, while 
backing up his research and claims with a mix of case law and writings by other experts 
in the field.  While it was clear that the author’s goal was to present a boiled-down and 
digestible version of his claims, there were several instances where subjects could have 
been provided with much greater breadth and detail to make them more understandable to 
a someone unfamiliar with the field.  In some instances, his use of many foreign treaties 
and commercial arbitration agreements muddied his points and were confusing as he 
attempted to tie them back into United States constitutional and arbitration law principles.   
 I would recommend this book to individuals wishing to explore the intersection of 
constitutional and arbitration law in many areas where the case law is still developing.  
This book is written to be accessible to readers with various levels of proficiency in the 
subject, not only specialists within the field of arbitration law.  The brevity of this book, 
while occasionally doing its content a disservice, provides a satisfying, but not overly 
burdensome, overview to the reader of the current state of the law regarding arbitration 
and the Constitution.  Rutledge does a thorough job confronting both sides of many 
possible arguments for and against different aspects of arbitration law with respect to the 
United States Constitution. 
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